Malvern Hill, Virginia

July 1, 1862 

Union Lines at Malvern Hill from a contemporary newspaper engraving.

The Peninsula Campaign, which had started with such high hopes, was drawing to a disastrous end. During the Seven Day Campaign, the mighty Army of the Potomac had suffered numerous defeats at the hands of the Army of Northern Virginia under the command of General Robert E. Lee. The battle of Frayser's Farm (or Glendale) had caused the Union army to take position on the high ground at Malvern Hill. Which is located in Virginia only fifteen miles southeast of Richmond. This encounter, involving nearly 160,000 men, was the sixth and the last of the Seven Day's Battles. It would be here that Union General George B. McClellan would demonstrate his ability to defend a position. Furthermore, the key to that defense would be his use of the Union artillery.

  The Union position was a formidable one and McClellan had chosen his ground well. Malvern Hill itself was more of a plateau than a hill. It rises about a hundred feet at its crest and forms a mile-and-a-half long crescent. Furthermore, Malvern Hill is bordered on the east by Western Run and on the west by Crewes Run. The creeks and high ground formed a natural defensive position that made flank attack very difficult. This would deprive Lee of one his favorite maneuvers and give the Union troops a tremendous advantage.

   Besides the difficult terrain, the Confederates faced another daunting obstacle, the well entrenched Union Army. Over 80,000 Union troops consisting of General Edwin Summer's II Corps, US Brigadier General Samuel Heintzelmen's III Corp, a division of US Brigadier General Erasmus D. Keye's IV Corps, and US Brigadier General John Porter's V Corp faced Lee's army. These troops did not use trenches; instead, they stood in line-of-battle formation. Besides the massed infantry, the Union had placed more than a hundred pieces of artillery along the rim of the plateau. Furthermore, 150 guns were in reserve near Malvern house. In spite of this impressive force, Lee continued to bring up his troops for battle despite warnings from CS  General Daniel Harvey Hill. 

Capt. Walter O. Bartlett

  The Union held all the cards with their artillery, but the same could not be said about the Rebels. A reconnaissance of the area by CS Major General James Longstreet found a plateau on the Confederate right that would have allowed them to bring massed artillery against the Union line. Longstreet felt that sixty guns in this position and an accompanying fire from CS Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson cannons on

the left would have the Union position in crossfire. This in turn would allow the Rebel infantry to assault the Union lines. Lee thought that this plan had the greatest success and set his troops into motion.

  It soon became apparent that this strategy would not work because the Confederates could not position their guns as they had planned. In fact, out of Longstreet's 140 cannon artillery reserve, only twenty had been placed. Swampy ground and heavily wooded terrain prevented access for these guns to be deployed.  Those

that were placed into position were quickly silenced by the massed Union artillery.  Lee, who had told his commanders: “ Batteries have been established to rake the Union line…” soon found his own artillery being raked. Lee realized that his plan would not succeed and began looking for another plan of attack Unfortunately, he failed to notify his commanders of the change of plan and they proceeded as ordered- straight into the unmolested Union positions. 

  As the Confederate artillery tried unsuccessfully to get into position, the Rebel Infantry began to

form for attack. The Confederate units used in this assault included, D. H. Hill's, CS Major General Benjamin Huger's, CS Major General John B. Magruder's   troops. These fore mentioned troops would bear the blunt of the attack. Two of Jackson's divisions, one under CS Mition.ajor General Richard S. Early and CS Brigadier General W.H.C. Whiting, were in reserve. The Confederate infantry stepped off from their position and entered what only could be described has a vortex of hell. Their brigades were cut to pieces as the Union artillery reined in their shoot and shell. The long ranged Parrott guns took a dreadful toll while the shorter ranged Napoleans, piled up the dead. The Confederates suffered more than 5,300 casualties without gaining an inch of ground. Other Confederates attacks up the cliff near the Crew house were also repelled. One Confederate officer correctly commented that “ It was not war, it was murder.”

Pvt. John Breen

  Rhode Island's Battery B First Light Artillery was part of the Corps Artillery Reserve, Second Corp (Sumner). So were Battery G, Rhode Island, and battery G, First New York. Battery B's commander was Captain W.O. Bartlett. The battery was in position in the reserve line of the Second Corp, which extended along the ridge northwest of the Binford House. While in this location, a Rebel battery took position in their front and opened fire on their lines. This battery was part of CS Major General Jackson's Corp. The Rhode Islanders were not permitted to engage the enemy battery, but were compelled to stand and take their fire.

Pvt. Calvin Rathbone

  Jackson's artillery fire was on target and for a short time “there was dire confusion.” In mid-afternoon, skirmishing fire in front succeeded the sound of heavy artillery in the rear. Troops were rushed forward and soon became fiercely engaged. While the battery was not called into action it did remain under fire in the line of reserve.

  Three men were wounded including Corporal Calvin W. Rathbone and John Green (Breen), a sturdy young Irishmen. These new casualties added to those already experienced during the Seven days Battle. Soon after the wounding of the men the battery received orders to limber up and withdraw. The tired artillerymen made their way towards the James River. Eventually the battery was parked, horses were unharnessed for the first time in several days and tended water and fed half rations.

  The interesting point about the battle of Malvern Hill is the role Union artillery had played. The Confederates did not come close in breaking the Union lines because of the galling artillery fire. General Robert E. Lee used a similar defense later that year at Fredericksburg. Yet, the lesson seemed to have been lost on Lee. Almost a year to the day he would again engage Union forces at Gettysburg. And in doing so, send nearly 15,000 Confederate troops against fixed Union artillery positions-with the same deadly results.